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REFLECTIONS ON THE CULTURAL LIVES
OF PROPERTY, COLLECTIVE IDENTITY,
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I. PROLOGUE
This is a set of reflections, ethnographically derived from
the rich set of experiences at the LatCrit-SALT 2013 Conference,
organized around the theme of “Resistance Rising: Theorizing and
Building Cross-Sector Movements.” Because of the diverse nature
of the experiences, ranging from insightful and humorous
reflections on how to prepare for the job market, to numerous
panels on collective identities and resistance, including thoughtprovoking Plenaries and Spotlight Lectures, to communitybuilding karaoke singing, salsa dancing and informally conversing,
I will have to limit my discussions to reflections that were
partially inspired by the panel on Reframing the Narrative in the
Era of Immigration Reform, composed of papers by Mariela
Olivares, Maritza Reyes, Lauren Heidbrink, Anita Ortiz Maddali,
and Karla Mari McKanders; Berta Hernandez-Truyol’s paper on

1 Caroline Joan S. Picart, Ph.D., J.D., Esq., was a University of Florida
Levin College of Law Postdoctoral Public Interest Fellow at the Eighth
Judicial Circuit (2013-2014) and currently practices in appellate criminal and
family law. She graduated with a joint Juris Doctor (cum laude) and M.A. in
May 2013, was the Tybel Spivack Fellow at the Center for Women’s Studies
and Gender Research at the University of Florida (2012-2013), and was the Sir
Run Run Shaw Scholar and Wolfson Prize Winner at the University of
Cambridge (1990-1991). Prior to law school, she was a tenured Associate
Professor of English and Humanities at Florida State University, with a
Courtesy Appointment at the Florida State University School of Law. Caroline
thanks Gerardo Rivera, her husband, and the Picart and Terrell families, for
their support.
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the Brazilian indigenous peoples’ struggles to protect their land,
property, and identity specifically in relation to building the Bel
Monte dam in Brazil; and Amna Akbar’s talk on the U.S. National
Security’s “Broken Windows” and recent developments in
“community policing” efforts in the national fight against
terrorism. Eventually, this paper arrives at my own presentation
on theorizing resistance in relation to intellectual property,
specifically, on the history of copyright in relation to choreography
in American dance, set against the backdrop of these particular
discussions.
Thematically, the paper uses an analysis of law as a culture,
and law in culture to examine a broad spectrum of different, but
convergent, strategies of resistance and adaptation, to the
prevailing power differentials embedded in law and culture.
II. REFLECTIONS ON INTERSECTIONALITIES: STRATEGIES OF
RESISTANCE IN RELATION TO N ARRATIVE, PROPERTY, AND
COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
I begin with the panel on Narrative and Immigration Reform
because the panel’s collective impact led to two models regarding
the nature of narrative, and possible strategies of resistance
amidst the backdrop of the flux and political forces of immigration
reform. One model, principally ethnographic, deployed narrative
as a medium capable of being a vessel of ambiguity and
ambivalence, particularly within the context of reflecting the
personal experiences of young immigrants, whose outsider status
remains uncertainly inscribed despite their apparent integration
Another model, principally
through formal legal processes. 2
politico-legal, deployed narrative as employing two sides: first, a
“front-stage” side which projects a narrative of legal coherence and
apparent integration; and second, a hidden “back-stage” view,
which reveals a narrative of legal inconsistencies and the
persistence of insidious culturally maintained discriminatory
castes based on race, class, and gender. 3
Correspondingly, the first narrative led to a strategy of
2 For a principally ethnographic approach to the study of law, both in the
U.S. and internationally, see generally JUNE STARR AND MARK G OODALE , EDS .
PRACTICING ETHNOGRAPHY IN LAW: NEW DIALOGUES, ENDURING METHODS
(2002).
3 See generally LINA NEWTON, ILLEGAL, ALIEN, OR IMMIGRANT:
THE
POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM (2008). Newton focuses on the social
construction of immigrants (both legal and illegal) as well as other target
groups (employers, the INS, U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants, and
state and local governments).
Newton eventually argues that public
discourses are actually policy narratives designed to attempt to persuade the
polity that the value judgments embedded in policy and legal discourses
justify who should be beneficiaries of, and who are burdens to, the government
and society.
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description – of attempting simply to draw attention to the
ambivalences and ambiguities of occupying an insider-outsider
position, or the status of an outsider within, or the process of
apparently successfully crossing a border only to find more
barriers within. In contrast, the second narrative led to a strategy
of deconstruction – of unveiling hidden binaries that require the
privileging of one class against its required other; of drawing
attention to the continued proliferation of monstrous metaphors in
relation to women and minorities; of unmasking how legal systems
can reify culturally conditioned categories of discrimination.
Nevertheless, the two types of narratives, and strategies of
resistance, are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
More
realistically, they remain porous.
Indeed, most of the papers
usually fluctuated between the two modes of framing
(ethnographic and politico-legal), and thus successfully deployed
both strategies (descriptive and deconstructive). 4
Although there are certainly important differences, Berta
Hernandez-Truyol’s 5 sympathetic account of the Brazilian
indigenous tribe’s continuing, and still peaceful, battle to maintain
control over its lands, its traditional knowledge, its ancestral
property, and collective identity, against the onslaught of Brazil’s
determined efforts to join the hallowed ranks of fully developed
nations through building the Bel Monte dam, has affinities with
the immigration panel’s reflections regarding narrative, law, and

4 For a deconstructive analysis of immigration law, see generally LEO R.
CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS AND
THE NATION (2008). Briefly and generally summarized, Chavez analyzes the
“Latino Threat Narrative” – a pernicious and pervasive popular cultural myth
that contemporary Latino immigrants (which targets principally Mexican
immigrants, U.S.-born Mexicans, and Mexico itself, but also extends to include
all Latino groups) are unlike earlier (European) immigrants and pose a
serious danger to the nation. However, using data gathered through surveys
and interviews done in Orange County in the 1990s and early 2000s, Chavez
debunks popular destructive stereotypes regarding Latinos, such as their
unassimilability, their stubborn language retention, their goal of “reconquering” the southwestern United States, and their (especially female)
hyperfertility. Unlike the narratives that invisibly shape immigration law,
Chavez’s data shows that, for example, Latino immigrants increase English
language usage and reduce their Spanish usage from the first to the third
generation; that they achieve significant upward mobility in terms of
education and income and eventually marry and integrate into more
ethnically and racially diverse communities the longer they live in the United
States; and that Latina women engage in intercourse at a later age, and have
fewer sexual partners, than white women in the U.S.
5 See BERTA ESPERANZA HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL AND STEPHEN J. POWELL,
JUST TRADE : A NEW COVENANT LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 206-230
(2009) (speaking on For Hernandez-Truyol’s general framework in
interpreting International Human Rights Law, trade, and the indigenous
peoples’ struggles to protect their rights); BERTA ESPERANZA HERNANDEZTRUYOL AND STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE : A NEW COVENANT LINKING
TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 206-230 (2009).
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resistance. This is not surprising because critical focus on the
subject positions that minorities and indigenous people, in
particular, occupy within the law (and as embedded in social
norms and relationships) is crucial to unveiling modes of historical
injustice.
This critical strategy provides a context for the
multitude of ways in which laws treat difference, 6 a theme that
has long been associated with LatCrit, as Tayyab Mahmud’s
lecture on the historical genesis and development of LatCrit
revealed. It is impossible to understand the positions minorities
and indigenous peoples in particular, occupy without first
grappling with the historical circumstances of colonization that
have shaped, and continue to influence, those positions.
The ways in which minorities and indigenous peoples have
been constructed and produced within the dominant legal system
is a result of social and political forces in which the law has always
been integrally engaged. This insight leads to the realization that
law is deeply and inseparably imbricated with politics, and that
law does not operate in a vacuum. The impetus, in critical legal
studies, to acknowledge the “special” circumstances under which
indigenous peoples in particular can fully enter legal discourse and
political life has spurred debates regarding the extent to which law
can accommodate difference.
One potentially creative area of tension for law is that
indigenous peoples present the possibility of presenting arguments
that could also be made in favor of groups in similar positions of
displacement and marginality due to evolving cultural
experiences, circumstances, and relations. The key issue is that
indigenous differences, in relation to some laws such as those
concerning land, property, and traditional knowledge, are localized
and particular. 7 Thus, moving from the particular to the general
For critical interpretations that analyze and deconstruct the position that
indigenous peoples occupy within the law, see generally P. HANKS AND B.
K EON-COHEN, ABORIGINES AND THE LAW (1984) (discussing the struggles of
indigenous people and their competition with a developing nation); R.L. Barsh,
Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law, 80 THE
AMERICAN J. OF INT’L L. 369 (1986); E. JOHNSON, M. HINTON AND D. RIGNEY,
EDS ., INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS AND THE LAW (1997); and C. CUNEEN AND T.
LIBESMAN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THE LAW IN AUSTRALIA (1995) (all stating
critical interpretations that analyze and deconstruct the position that
indigenous peoples occupy within the law).).
7 JANE E. ANDERSON, LAW, K NOWLEDGE , CULTURE : THE PRODUCTION OF
INDIGENOUS K NOWLEDGE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2009). Anderson
focuses on a social theory of law, and on an alternative epistemology of
knowledge embedded in indigenous culture, especially those of tribes in
Australia.
See generally INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: G ENETIC RESOURCES, K NOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (Silke von
Lewinski, ed., 2008). This edited collection, in its second edition, has eight
contributors, all of whom argue, using different case studies that the
commercial exploitation of indigenous knowledge and resources occur amidst a
significant clash of cultures. All eight contributors explore ways in which
6
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concerning what would best protect a particular tribe’s rights,
compared to the collective rights of indigenous peoples, at the
national level, is problematic. For example, in a country like the
Philippines, which has over 100 ethno-linguistic groups, 8 each
with its own specific conditions of engagement with the
majoritarian culture, sometimes conflicting demands of greater
inclusion in, or greater independence from, majoritarian politics
and economics, arise.
As the Bel Monte struggle shows, the language of property
has become a touchstone of the ways in which indigenous
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions have
become positioned in law. Beginning first with land rights and
ownership of material cultural products, such discussions also
engage issues of intellectual property. The power of property is
that it is both in law, and beyond law; it is both a legal and social
trope. Property, as Joseph Singer points out, is less about “things”
than about relationships among legal entities. 9 As such, the
concept of property mediates the way people and other legal
entities, such as legal, governmental, or nongovernmental
institutions, interact.
Very clearly, modern western notions of property are
fundamentally shaped by the narrative of Locke’s theory of labor
and private property. A crucial source, often cited, for the current
interpretation of Lockean notions of property, is the following
passage:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be Common
to all Men, yet every Man has a Property of his own
Person. This nobody has any right but himself. The
Labour of his body and the Work of his hands, we may say
are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the
State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
mixed his Labour with, and joined [sic] to it something
that is his own and thereby makes it his Property. 10
Locke’s theory of the primacy of private property rests on a
tripartite foundation. First is an iteration of natural law: that
“every Man has a Property of his Person,” and that “Labour of his
intellectual property law potentially can expand to accommodate the interests
of indigenous people as applied to the ownership and control of their
traditional knowledge, genetic resources, indigenous names and designations,
and folklore.
8 Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines, Office
of the President, National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, available at
http://www.ncip.gov.ph/indigenous-peoples-of-the-philippines.h tml.
9 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW:
RULES, POLICIES AND
PRACTICES xli (2d ed. 1997)
10 JOHN LOCKE , TWO TREATISES OF G OVERNMENT 136 (1990; first
published 1689).
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body and Work of his hands’ form the first spoke.” 11 The second
and third spokes are bound up with how labor creates value. The
second foundation is that it is via that expenditure or investment
of individual labor, mingled with the state of nature that produces
something new, which thus becomes the private property of the
investor. 12 The third foundation, generally writ large, is that it is
the investment of labor that produces value, as there is nothing
inherently of value in the state of nature. 13 This results in two
foundational principles of modern western property law: the law of
capture, and the principle of labor investment. Labor is exerted to
cultivate, extract, and create value out of something that would
otherwise be in the state of nature, of no inherent private value.
Locke’s theory of labor and natural law thus rests upon a hidden
narrative of binaries: the human versus the natural; the active
versus the passive; the private versus the commons. Also implicit
in Locke’s theory of labor is a specific type of laborer, with a
specific type of relationship to that which can be claimed as
property. Additionally, inherent in that specific type of laborer is
an imbricated notion of civilization, as labor is presumed to
improve the land and to improve upon the state of nature. It is
unsurprising that Locke’s theory of labor and property does not
consider lands untilled and uncultivated in the European sense to
be anyone’s property, and presumes that “uncivilized” peoples add
no value to the state of nature because, tautologically, they are not
possessors of a civilized culture, and are themselves embedded in a
state of nature.
Yet the contemporary emphasis on property as relational is
less a Lockean concept than a contribution by Jeremy Bentham. 14
For Bentham, it is less natural rights that generate value in
property, than the fact that relations of property constitute social
relations and power differentials. 15 The narrative of the “value” of
property therefore is defined by the complex constellation of these
relationships, and not by some objective measure, which can be
calibrated apart from these social relations.
Yet these social regulations are maintained and upheld
through the rule of law; it is law that provides the frameworks
guiding the conceptions of what is “naturally” owned, and the
entitlement of what certain types of persons can “naturally” expect
to possess. Nevertheless, there is one more layer to add: the
economic transformation of property, creating new forms of
expectations and entitlements. Writ large, cumulative property
Id.
Id.
13 Id.
14 Jeremy Bentham, Chapter VIII – Of Property, PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM
AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 51-52 (originally printed in 1789, Crawford Brough
Macpherson, ed., reprinted 1978).
15 Id.
11
12
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relations become infused with a systemic drive to generate
revenue or capital, and government influences demarcate political
spheres of interaction. The workings of the market generate new
expectations or new assumptions concerning what is collectively
culturally “natural,” and it is the law that regulates and maintains
these expectations, which cement the foundations of society.
Thus, it is hardly surprising, in some ways, that the
justification for evolving modes of “community policing,” as
discussed by Amna Akbar, finds its genesis in a theory of “broken
windows” – a metaphor that builds upon a legitimized notion of
private property that has been rendered dangerously porous to the
public, inviting the possibility of even greater transgressions of the
security of the private–public divide, or the escalation of criminal
elements that could render the private–public demarcation
meaningless, making everything potentially “non-private” or open
to the law of capture. 16 Broken windows theory, as a metaphor
embodying a theory concerning policing crime, is the view that
broken windows potentially invite criminal elements in, providing
for the possibility for even more heinous crimes to be committed.
Thus, broken windows theory is essentially preventative police
strategy – by spotting the broken windows and clamping down on
them, the police and those sympathetic to law enforcement can
counteract both potential criminal, and more importantly,
terrorist, activity.
Current rhetorical narratives, legal and
popular, frame terrorism as the ultimate iteration of the
monstrous. 17 Broken windows theory, as applied to counterradicalization tactics in the U.S., therefore necessarily assumes a
pro-law enforcement bent, and is inflexible in accommodating
difference in that area. The very metaphors of monstrosity in
relation to terrorism that proliferate in relation to terrorists – such
as werewolves or hyper-lethal viruses – that appear human by
day, only to, like werewolves, suddenly transform into primitive
beasts of destruction or, blend innocuously, like viruses, only to
transmogrify into uncompromising invaders of the metaphorical
immune system of society – provide the cultural logic for this
uncompromising imperative. Interestingly, monstrous metaphors
(or alternatively, images of the “authentic” victim deserving of
salvation), as the papers on the panel on immigration showed,
16 See, e.g., George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 1,1982), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/
304465/; Gordon Bazemore, The “Community” in Community Justice: Issues,
Themes, and Questions for the New Neighborhood Sanctioning Models, 19
JUST. SYSTEM J. 193, 198-099 (1997); WILLIAM LYONS, THE POLITICS OF
COMMUNITY POLICING: REARRANGING THE POWER TO PUNISH 40-43 (1999).
17 For a general gloss, see generally Caroline J.S. Picart and Cecil Greek,
Profiling the Terrorist as a Mass Murderer, SPEAKING OF MONSTERS: A
TERATOLOGICAL ANTHOLOGY 157 (Caroline J.S. and John E. Browning, eds.,
2012).
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continue to proliferate in relation to women, minorities, and the
poor – though perhaps not to the same unabashed degree as in
relation to the image of the terrorist.
Akbar’s account of the problems or tensions inherent in the
U.S. counter-radicalization’s miming of community policing’s
“broken windows” theory partakes of a similar critical dynamic as
the papers on the Immigration panel. In a manner akin to the
strategies undertaken by those papers, Akbar performs two
essential tasks. First, she documents the tensions that result from
law enforcement’s efforts to form close collaborative ties with
Moslem communities in the attempt to detect and weed out
radicalized Moslems, while treating the same Moslem [Should this
be “Muslim” to be consistent?] communities as potential breeding
sites of these monstrous elements. Second, she also unveils such
efforts to apparently form coalitions with Moslem communities as
simply strategic and political “frontstage,” with the “backstage”
revealing a darker underside – an expansion of state-sponsored
police power over especially poor Moslems, with being a Moslem
being an intrinsic part of the monstrous profile of the terrorist.
Any indication of being a devout Moslem (e.g., growing a beard,
attending mosque services regularly) is given free license to be
interpreted as a possible “broken window” indicating a possible
domestic access point for terrorism. As such, the identity of being
Moslem is profiled as part of the necessary identity of the terrorist
– a popular myth that many studies debunk as simplistic, Akbar
claims.
Nevertheless, the insight that this inflexibility of equating
all Moslem cultural traits as symptomatic of the profile of a
terrorist simply underlines a central insight cultural critics like
Edward Ingebretsen have shown: that monster talk functions
essentially as public preachment (that “tells a story, explains that
story, and draws moral conclusions, simultaneously”), 18 and that
the converse of the “Monster” (this time, writ large as the
(Moslem) Terrorist), is the Good Citizen. 19 Though different in
degree, the law’s encounter with the threat of terrorism has
affinities with law’s conflicts in attempting to address the
otherness of indigenous cultures, as Hernandez-Truyol’s paper
It is thus unsurprising that in parallel, and more
shows. 20
militant indigenous movements, such as those of the Mapuche

18 EDWARD J. INGEBRETSEN, AT STAKE : MONSTERS AND THE RHETORIC OF
FEAR IN PUBLIC CULTURE , 43 (2003).
19 For an in-depth examination of the evolution of monstrous metaphors in
relation to media depictions of terrorists, see generally Caroline Joan (Kay)
Picart and Cecil Greek, Profiling the Terrorist as Mass Murderer, in
MONSTERS IN AND AMONG US : TOWARD A G OTHIC CRIMINOLOGY, 256-288
(Caroline Joan (Kay) Picart and Cecil Greek eds. 2007) (examining the
evolution of monstrous metaphors in relation to media depictions of terrorists).
20 Supra note 2.
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tribe in Chile, the Chilean government has begun to deploy antiterrorism laws against these indigenous movements. 21
One insight that emerges is that the law is most capable of
moderating difference when these differences are translated into a
semblance or a close enough guise of its own categories or
frameworks. Both indigenous movements’, as well as minority
groups’, attempts to protect their cultural integrity and cultural
expressions, as well as their autonomies, often first appear to
integrate into the system, only to attempt to re-imagine the
system from within – exploring what Michel Foucault has
described as the lacunae and flows of power. 22 Strategies of
resistance are not linear but adaptive, and there are multiple ways
of resisting the circulations of power, both collectively and
individually, and thus generating new forces of political impetus.
Michel de Certeau has argued that it is possible to subvert
hegemonic cultural representations and laws, “not by [overtly]
rejecting or altering them, but by using them with respect to ends
and references foreign to the system.” 23 What de Certeau proposes
is, in some ways, as old as a central tenet of Zen and the martial
arts – that one can use the energy of one’s opponent against him
by following that flow, and then at a crucial point, using it as a
pivot to redirect the flow.
The primacy of law and legal frameworks in mediating
some political struggles is a key thematic of LatCrit. In the
context of property, as we have seen, law operates as a locus where
conflicting, competing positions gain circulation. This holds true,
not only in the case of sovereignty claims, as in HernandezTruyol’s paper on the Brazilian indigenous peoples’ attempts to
preserve fundamental control of their lands, but also in terms of
value systems and intellectual traditions in relation to knowledge
use, management, access and circulation. 24 As we shall see in the
next section, especially in the realm of intellectual property, some
21 For an example of the use of anti-terrorism laws against the Mapuche,
see Gale Courey Toensing, Inter-American Court Hears Mapuche Human
Rights Case Against Chile, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (June 3, 2013), available
at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/06/03/in ter-americancourt-hears-mapuche-human-rights-case-against-chile-149677. See also Luis
Carcamo-Huechante, Mapuche Political Prisoners Hearing at the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, May 29-30, 2013, CULTURAL SURVIVAL
(May 15, 2013), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/mapuche-politicalprisoners-hearing-inter-american-court-human-rights-may-29-30-2013; Ryan
Seelau, Mapuche Testify Against Chile Before Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, INDIGENOUS NEWS (May 31, 2013),
http://indigenousnews.org/2013/05/31/mapuche-testify-against-chile-beforeinter-american-court-of-human-rights-oas/.
22 See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH
OF THE PRISON, (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the ebb and flow of power).
23 MICHEL DE CERTAEU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LI fe xiii (S. Rendall
trans., 1984).
24 Supra note 2.
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incommensurable differences in knowledge production, ownership,
and protection constitute some of the seemingly insurmountable
obstacles that prevent closure or even rapprochement on some
topics of discussion. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the complex
relationship between knowledge and power, subjects of emergent
forms of property, especially intangible intellectual property, once
created, begin to generate their own frameworks of interpretation,
by adapting the hegemonic culture’s tools. Thus, such hybrid
embryonic forms of legal expression are not simply artifacts of the
colonizer’s tools, but also, as modified and adopted by minorities,
marginalized groups, and indigenous peoples, become a feature of
these outsider-insiders’ means of self-governance.
For even if
concepts like “property” and “ownership” may not fully encompass
indigenous
and
minority
aspirations,
relationships,
and
perspectives, these western concepts at least provide a readily
recognized and accepted set of terms through which indigenous
and minority aspirations may be given voices.
Thus, despite some meaning incommensurability, whose
richness of cultural difference becomes reduced through legal
translation via an existing hegemonic structure, law also relies
upon these cultural differences in order to grapple effectively with
the strictures of legal interpretation, mediation, and when
possible, remedy. These complex functions are intrinsically part of
the way in which law functions both in culture, and as culture.
Crucial to this dynamic is the fact that law, much as any dominant
culture does, tends to reject difference that is presented in radical
terms, much as it tends to accommodate difference that is
presented as translatable, even if partially, in its own terms, using
its own symbol systems, as points of reference. “This is the reality
of legal engagement with differentials, cultural or political, as law
mediates a space that does not destabilize its own narrative of
internal cohesion.” 25 This is a crucial insight, as we shall see in the
next section, which deals more with minority rights and
intellectual property in relation to the history of American dance.
III. STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE IN RELATION TO COPYRIGHT AND
CHOREOGRAPHY IN AMERICAN DANCE
This section transplants many of the insights of the prior
section, concerning narrative, principles of property law, the
cultural functions of law, and strategies of resistance, into an
analysis of the development of federal copyright protection for
choreography in the U.S. This section, derived from a larger
project, 26 argues that the effort to win federal copyright protection
25 See generally JANE E. ANDERSON, LAW, K NOWLEDGE , CULTURE :
THE
PRODUCTION OF INDIGENOUS K NOWLEDGE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
(2009) (stating that the law tends to reject radical ideas).
26 See generally CAROLINE JOAN S. PICART, CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND
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for dance choreography in the United States was simultaneously
racialized and gendered. As applied in this section, “whiteness” is
about having property (both tangible and intangible), being
privileged enough to be considered an “artist,” and consistently
being protected by the law in a seemingly “neutral” process. All
these certainly implicate an analysis of the assumptions about
“authorship,” “creativity” and “property” behind American
copyright law, as it has evolved, mirroring the potentials and
tensions of its historical moorings. As the cases of Loïe Fuller,
Josephine Baker, and Katherine Dunham show, white privilege
often sustains its privileged position through an ambivalent
posture of negation.
As Jacques Derrida’s analysis of the
mechanics of deconstruction 27 unveils, white privilege requires its
“other” to demarcate itself, and to establish its (comparative)
superiority.
Nevertheless, whiteness is not monolithic.
Furthermore, possessors of white privilege are not uniformly
protected/culturally; law is both embedded in a broader cultural
backdrop, and functions as a culture, legally. Ultimately, I mean
that “whiteness,” functioning as “property,” is not a monolithic
stable “thing” but a site of complex political and cultural
contestation.
Additionally, white privilege’s underside is a
fascination with, and envy of, that which is non-white, which it
appropriates unto itself through its characterization of the
“exotic.”
This section limits itself to briefly tracing Loïe Fuller’s rise to
stardom 28 in Paris as “La Loïe” and her failure to secure copyright
protection in the landmark trial, Fuller v. Bemis (1892). 29 But the
bulk of the section, as an exploration of possible alternative
copyrightable
choreographic
aesthetics, analyzes Josephine
Baker’s
equally phenomenal rise to becoming Europe’s “Black
Venus,” 30 and Katherine Dunham’s eventual enshrinement as the
COPYRIGHT IN AMERICAN DANCE : WHITENESS AS STATUS PROPERTY (2013)
(stating that copyrighting choreography has not been gender or sexual
neutral). The section on copyright and choreography has been adapted from
this book.
27 Jacques Derrida, Interview with Julia Kristeva, POSITIONS 42 (trans.
Alan Bass 1981). See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE
(Alan Bass trans., 1978).
28 For an autobiography of Fuller, see generally LOÏE FULLER, FIFTEEN
YEARS OF A DANCER’S LIFE (1913); for a biography, see generally ANN COOPER
ALBRIGHT, TRACES OF LIGHT: ABSENCE AND PRESENCE IN THE WORK OF LOÏE
FULLER (2007).
29 See Fuller v. Bemis, 50 F. 926 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892) (showing the
importance of this trial to choreography and copyright).
30 For biographies of Josephine Baker, see generally BENNETTA JULES ROSETTE , JOSEPHINE BAKER IN ART AND LIFE : THE ICON AND THE IMAGE
(2007) and T. DENEAN SHARPLEY-WHITING, BLACK VENUS:
SEXUALIZED
SAVAGES, PRIMAL FEARS, AND PRIMITIVE NARRATIVES IN FRENCh (1999). For
an edited autobiography, see generally JOSEPHINE BAKER AND JO BOUILLON,
JOSEPHINE (Mariana Fitzpatrick, trans., 1977).
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“Matriarch of Black Dance” in the U.S. 31 More significantly, as a
way of theorizing the complex questions of resistance in relation to
race, gender and choreographic authorship, this section examines
why, if Baker had dared mount a claim for copyright protection for
her dance improvisations like Fuller, such a claim would have
failed even more miserably, despite her celebrity. Crucial to the
differences between the conditions of possibility within which
Fuller, as opposed to Baker, could attempt to claim ownership of
her choreographic works was her possession of an aesthetic of
whiteness and of whiteness as status property, even if her sex and
gender trumped her whiteness. Compared with Baker, Katherine
Dunham succeeded in establishing copyright ownership of her
choreography through a complex set of factors, some of which
include her whitened academic credentials, 32 her embodiment of
Caucasian beauty ideals, her comparatively lightly complected
skin (even as she embraced her African American heritage), and
her savvy understanding of the dance community’s norms of
hierarchy. 33 The norms in place then generally held that any
choreographic contributions by black choreographers were
rendered invisible and attributed to white choreographers. 34
Dunham upheld these norms, in relation to Balanchine, but
shortly thereafter, building upon the fame that followed her
successful apprenticeship, established her own company and
choreographic identity. 35
Generally sketched, to understand how the history of the
ability to copyright choreography maps on its invisible underside,
whiteness as status property, one must turn, arguably, to its
master template. Unlike Loïe Fuller, also a pioneer of American
31 For an autobiography of Katherine Dunham, see generally JOYCE
ASCHENBRENNER, K ATHERINE DUNHAM : DANCING A LIFE (2002); for writings
by and about Katherine Dunham, see generally, Vévé A. Clark and Sara E.
Johnson, eds., K AISO! WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT K ATHERINE DUNHAM (2005).
32 Dunham had a master’s degree in Anthropology from the University of
Chicago; among her mentors were Robert Redfield, Melville Herkovits,
Edward Sapir, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Lloyd
Warner, among others. Aschenbrenner, supra note 31 at 29. Dunham’s
master’s thesis, The Dances of Haiti, was eventually published by
Northwestern University in 1947.
NANCY REYNOLDS AND MALCOLM
MCCORMICK, NO FIXED POINTS: DANCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 341
(2003).
33 See Constance Valis Hall, Collaborating with Balanchine on Cabin in the
Sky: Interviews with Katherine Dunham, K AISO! WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT
K ATHERINE DUNHAM 235-47 (Vévé A. Clark and Sara E. Johnson) (where
Dunham was evasive regarding the extent of Bakanchine’s actual
contributions to the choreography).
34 For the invisibility of black choreographers, see generally, Danielle
Robinson, “Oh, You Black Bottom!” Appropriation, Authenticity and
Opportunity in the Jazz Dance Teaching of 1920s New York, 38 DANCE
RESEARCH JOURNAL 1 / 2 (2006): 19-42.
35 This thesis is argued more extensively in PICART, CRITICAL RACE
THEORY AND COPYRIGHT, supra note 26 at 105-111.
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modern dance, George Balanchine, a Russian émigré, succeeded in
gaining and maintaining full control of his choreographic
A hyper-whitened aesthetic and Balanchine’s
creations. 36
authority as a white male ballet-master—both manifestations of
whiteness as status property, were crucial to that success.
In contrast, Fuller, who pre-dated Balanchine by almost a
hundred years, was the first white woman choreographer in the
U.S. to attempt to establish an infringement claim in response to
what she saw as the stealing of her “original” dance material, and
failed. 37. As a choreographer, Fuller’s genius lay in her
appropriation of the general aesthetic of the skirt dance, 38 to
“whiten” it beyond its burlesque, working-class roots to become an
iconic image of Art Nouveau. Fuller’s serpentine dance, at the
height of her artistic career, became immortalized as a metaphor
for a powerful, abstract expressiveness beyond language and
corporeality. As opposed to the illusion of her stage presence,
Fuller, then already thirty years old, hardly the conventional
beauty, and knowing that her theatrical career and financial
stability hinged on her ability to control ownership of the
serpentine dance, turned to the legal apparatus for protection
against copyright infringement, 39 rather than relying on
community norms within the dance community.
However, in an opinion that has become much quoted, Judge
Lacombe of the New York Circuit Court dismissed Fuller’s
serpentine dance as unworthy of copyright protection because of
This opinion
its lack of “narrative” or “dramatic” content. 40
became virtually enshrined as the legal basis for denying dance
choreography (or anything that was merely “spectacle” or
“decorative”) copyright protection.
What the judge did not

36 For cases that establish Balanchine’s ownership of his copyright, and the
scope of that copyright, see Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1169
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986). For
biographical accounts of Balanchine’s choreography and its eventual
copyrighting, see generally BERNARD TAPER, BALANCHINE : A BIOGRAPHY
WITH A NEW EPILOGUE (1984) and ROBERT G OTTLIEB, G EORGE BALANCHINE :
THE BALLET MAKER (2004).
37 Id. See also Fuller, 50 F. 926 (where Fuller attempted to raise a
copyright claim over her choreography of the skirt dance but failed).
38 “Skirt dancing” was a popular dance that hung, uneasily, as a
compromise between “the overly academic ballet of the time and the more
outrageous step-kick dancing such as the can-can (le chahut) or its English
derivative, the “la-ra-ra-boom-de-ay.” J.E. Crawford Flitch, MODERN DANCING
AND DANCERS 72 (1912).
The “skirt dance” was then associated with the
burlesque, or “low” art; Fuller’s conversion of the “skirt” dance into the
“serpentine” dance lay largely in her restaging of it, through the incorporation
of a carefully designed staged and lighting effects, for which she successfully
established patents. For a biographical account, see ALBRIGHT, supra note 28
at 185.
39 See generally Fuller v. Bemis, supra note 29.
40 Id.
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explicitly address was Fuller’s class status as a vaudeville
performer and her proximity to the purely “popular,” merely
“illusory,” or “decorative” forms of entertainment, such as belly
dancing, for example.
In contrast to Fuller’s ethereal stage presence, Baker
stepped into a series of historical convergences that iconized her as
the “Ebony Venus,” the “Black Venus”, the “Jazz Empress,” and
the very embodiment of Black Womanhood. 41 In compliance with
the image projected on her by her promoters and audiences, Baker
wielded five performancestrategies of image and identity
construction, which included: exoticizing race and gender;
overturning racial and cultural codes and meanings; performing
“difference” through nudity, cross-dressing, song, and dance;
exploiting these images of difference; and generalizing the outcome
to allow the performance messages to reach larger popular
audiences. 42
Ironically, in order to remain “the same” – as an “exotic”
sexualized object of fascination – Baker would have to constantly
And a key component to Baker’s many
remake herself. 43
transformations is her consistent “whitening” as a wild child
civilized into Parisienne culture. This process of transformation
occurred both personally and professionally, as Baker moved from
being a body acted upon, to becoming a specular projection of the
Choreographically, the roots of the “authentic
star system. 44
Africanist” dance style Europe venerated 45 were African-American
street dances magnified through Baker’s hyperbolic and
flamboyant exaggerations. More precisely, they lay in Baker’s
41 For a proliferation of these metaphors in relation to Josephine Baker,
see generally Wendy Martin, “Remembering the Jungle”: Josephine Taylor
and the Modernist Parody, PREHISTORIES OF THE FUTURE : THE PRIMITIVIST
PROJECT AND THE CULTURE OF MODERNISM 310 (Elazar Barkan and Ronald
Bush, eds., 1996).
42 Samir Dayal, Blackness as Symptom:
Josephine Baker and European
Identity, BLACKENING EUROPE : THE AFRICAN AMERICAN PRESENCE ,50 (Heike
Raphaeil-Hernandez, ed., 2004).
43 For a biographical account of Josephine Baker’s self-transformations, see
generally JEAN-CLAUDE BAKER AND CHRIS CHASE , JOSEPHINE : THE HUNGRY
HEART (2001).
44 Julia Foulkes locates Baker’s rise to stardom as part of the flowering of
the Harlem Renaissance in the 1920’s. JULIA L. FOULKES, MODERN BODIES:
DANCE AND AMERICAN MODERNISM FROM MARTHA G RAHAM TO ALVIN AILEY
23 (2002). For an account of Josephine Baker and the star system of France
during the time of her ascent in popularity, see generally Terri Francis, The
Audacious Josephine Baker: Stardom, Cinema, Paris, in BLACK EUROPE AND
THE AFRICAN DIASPORA (Darlene Clark Hine, Trica Danielle Keaton, and
Stephen Small, eds., 2009).
45 This “authentic” Africanist style was characterized as “primitivist,”
“animal,” “sensual,” and “uninhibited.”
For example, see description of
Baker’s sensationalized entrance at the Théâtre des Champs-Élysées during
the opening of La Revue Nègre on October 2, 1925 in Baker and Chase, supra
note 43 at 5-6.
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spontaneous
improvisational
reinterpretations
of
popular
American “street” dance steps.
But in terms of choreographic protection, like Fuller, Baker’s
claim to ownership of her choreographic improvisations, if she had
dared to mount such a claim, would have failed, not simply
because it would probably have been dismissed, like Fuller’s claim,
as pure “spectacle.” Even more significantly, because given Baker’s
performances’ overt eroticism and closeness to vaudeville
traditions and “popular” dance steps, Baker’s claim would
probably also have been roundly dismissed as “obscene,” lacking
originality, and not “promoting the advancement of science and
the useful arts,” 46 which is the principal objective of patent and
copyright protection. Even more problematically, improvisation,
because it is not movement fixed in a replicable flow, is not
These rules are historically grounded in
copyrightable. 47
copyright’s rootedness in Eurocentric conventions, 48 which set
apart
the
“genius”
required
for
an
individual
artist/author/choreographer’s work to be protected as private
intellectual property from the merely “popular” entertainment or
“folk” conventions for which no individual can take credit.
Given this historical context, had Baker attempted to follow
Fuller’s example, her claim would have failed. Nevertheless, traces
of a nonwhite aesthetic, even if hyperbolically rendered a spectacle
through colonialist and commercialist lenses, can be glimpsed
through her dance legacy. As Samir Dayal remarks:
“[Baker’s] legacy may not be that of a profoundly
U,S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8.
At the federal level, copyrights do not protect ideas, procedures,
processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries:
copyright protection extends to physical representations because these fulfill
the “fixation” requirement. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Anything unrecorded is not
copyrightable, in as much as it is not "fixed;" for example, dances and
improvisations themselves are not copyrightable: only visual recordings or
written descriptions of them are. Baker was seen more as a spontaneous
performer, than a choreographer who planned, and recorded, his
choreography. The Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have Power...
[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8. The Supreme Court has
interpreted the term "Writings" expansively "to include any physical rendering
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor." Goldstein v California,
412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
48 Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright, 17 EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY STUDIES 44 (1984). See also Caroline Joan S. Picart and Marlowe
Fox, Beyond Unbridled Optimism and Fear: Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual
Property, Human Rights and the Globalization of Traditional Knowledge and
Expressions of Folklore (Part I), 15 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LAW REVIEW
3, 319-339 (2013) (explaining how the Eurocentric origins of intellectual
property law make it difficult to protect the intellectual property rights of
indigenous peoples).
46
47
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subversive and parodic cultural activist. But no one can
deny her immense performative breadth or the role she
played in the ‘blackening’ of the European cultural scene.
Nor can it be denied that her presence in that scene
brought to the fore how intimately ‘blackness’ was
sutured to the construction of modern white European
subjectivity.” 49
In comparison with Josephine Baker, Katherine Dunham’s
rise to stardom coincided with Baker’s decline as the embodiment
of the erotic and primal “savage” and Martha Graham’s (among
other white women) deployment of a then-principally sexless
model of modern dancing (this was prior to Graham’s involvement
with Erick Hawkins). 50 In the face of these pre-existing and often
stereotyped and racialized templates, Dunham was noteworthy in
her self-proclaimed project of integrating “African dance traditions
that featured more forthright acceptance of sexual elements in
dance.” 51
And indeed, Dunham’s choreography and dance technique,
unlike Baker’s, not only consciously used “whitened” (and
established) elements of ballet and modern dance, but also a
vocabulary of movement that had clear “non-whitened” elements,
derived from her memory of her fieldwork as an anthropologist in
the West Indies (Jamaica, Trinidad, Cuba, Haiti, Martinique). 52 53
Dunham’s dance technique had clear non-European elements, but
hybridized it with white traces, which, like her academic
credentials, served to authorize her work, particularly in Europe.
The technique she developed “emphasized the torso movements of
the primitive ritual of Caribbean-African dance and jazz
rhythms.” 54
Though Dunham self-identified herself as black, and declared

Id. at 50.
For biographical accounts of the rivalry between Dunham and Baker in
relation to their celebrity and beauty, see Aschenbrenner, DANCING A LIFE ,
supra note 31 at 143, and JEAN-CLAUDE BAKER AND CHRIS CHASE , JOSEPHINE :
THE HUNGRY HEART 285 (2001).
51
JULIA L. FOULKES, MODERN BODIES:
DANCE AND AMERICAN
MODERNISM FROM MARTHA G RAHAM TO ALVIN AILEY 72 (2002).
52 For an analysis of the ethnographic origins of Dunham’s choreography,
based on her field studies in the West Indies (Jamaica, Trinidad, Cuba, Haiti,
Matinique), see generally Halifu Osumare, Dancing the Black Atlantic:
Katherine Dunham’s Research-to-Performance Method in Migration of
Movement: Dance Across Americas, AMERIQUEST 7 no. 2 (2010), available at
http://ejournals.library.vanderbilt.edu/index.php/ameriquests/ar tic le/view/165.
53 Ann Barzel, Mark Turbyfill and Ruth Page, The Lost Ten Years: The
Untold Story of the Dunham-Turbyfill Alliance, K AISO! WRITINGS BY AND
ABOUT K ATHERINE DUNHAM , 179 (Vévé A. Clark and Sara E. Johnson eds.,
2005).
54 Id. at 179.
49
50
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a social activist impetus to her work, 55 Dunham, in terms of her
physical appearance, was clearly of a mixed racial heritage, and
her own autobiography emphasized that hybridity. Dunham
fiercely described herself as a “black woman” when her physical
features placed her in a liminal sphere – one that tended to be in
line with white ideals of feminine beauty. The point is not that
“blackness” or “whiteness” is easy to demarcate, but that her
choice to position herself as a black woman was a political and
aesthetic choice – not a description of biology.
In addition,
Dunham’s combination of academic credentials of the highest
caliber, 56 her practical fieldwork experience, and her visually
arresting reinterpretation of ethnographic experience into
choreographic staging yielded refractory responses from the dance
world, critics, and the public. 57 Nevertheless, unlike Baker, whose
lack of education was apparent from the start, making Baker the
perfect iconic colonial subject requiring French civilization,
Dunham was portrayed as someone with both sophistication and
eloquence, as well as the exotic primitivism Baker had come to
symbolize. The fact that Dunham’s second husband, John Pratt –
the man who costumed her 58 – was also white, probably helped to
further “whiten” Dunham, which worked to her unambiguous
advantage in Europe but elicited more ambivalent responses in
the U.S.
Choreographically, Dunham is notable for incorporating not
only “folkloric” material derived from a broad variety of “exotic”
sources, but also the familiar street-derived U.S. social dance steps
characteristic of African American entertainers that Baker
surreptitiously drew from and exaggerated, either comedically or
sensually. 59 But despite Dunham’s eclecticism, she did privilege
the Caribbean as the ethnographic cradle from which she sought
to discover and rearticulate a basic vocabulary that seemed, to her,
One
to be common to African-derived dances in the U.S. 60
55 Katherine Dunham, quoted in Harriet Jackson, American Dancer,
Negro, DANCE MAGAZINE 40 (September 1966). This same information is
stated in Dunham’s autobiography, A TOUCH OF INNOCENCE : MEMOIRS OF
CHILDHOOD (1994).
56 Aschenbrenner, DANCING A LIFE , supra note 31 at 29.
57 See generally Ramsay Burt, Katherine Dunham’s Rite de Passage:
Censorship and Sexuality, in EM BODYING LIBERATION: THE BLACK BODY IN
AMERICAN DANCE (Dorothea Fischer-Hornung and Alison D. Goeller eds.,
2001) (detailing American critics’ struggles to reconcile Dunham’s status as an
intellectual and a dancer who celebrated the sexualized elements that
characterized her choreography).
58 Vévé A. Clark, Designing Dunham: John Pratt’s Method in Costume and
Décor: An Interview with John Pratt, K AISO! WRITINGS BY AND ABOUT
K ATHERINE DUNHAM 208 (Vévé A. Clark and Sara E. Johnson, eds. 2005).
59 PHYLLIS ROSE , JAZZ CLEOPATRA:
JOSEPHINE BAKER IN HER TIME 67
(1989) (describing how Baker drew from American popular street dances,
which included the element of comedically eye-rolling).
60 Joyce Aschenbrenner, Katherine Dunham: Reflections on the Social and
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difference between Baker and Dunham was that while Baker
sought to conceal the American-ness of the genealogy of her dance
steps, wrapping them in the shroud of the “eternal primitive” so
precious to the European imaginary, Dunham sought to unveil and
celebrate the uniqueness of African American street dances, as
expressions of African and American culture. 61
Dunham cemented her career and reputation through what
she called “revues” – staging her re-memory of her anthropological
experiences and Caribbean dance and music together with the
opulent
settings,
brightly
colored
costumes,
orchestral
reinterpretations of the Caribbean rhythms and folk music, and
the polished look of American showbiz. But it was only after she
was already established that Dunham “collaborated” with George
Balanchine on Cabin in the Sky (1940).). 62 Ironically, the 1940
Broadway production of Cabin in the Sky did not give Dunham
any credit as a choreographer. 63
Nevertheless, in Dunham’s extended interview with
Constance Valis Hall conducted on November 1999 and January
2000, Dunham revealed, after much prodding, that she not only
choreographed most, if not all, of the numbers, but also, as
Aschenbrenner remarks, that “she staged most of the show,
although she was not given credit for it.” 64 Nevertheless, overall,
it is clear that Dunham’s credentials as an academic, her
glamorized image, and the very manner in which she staged her
ethnographic research as performances, did privilege and protect
her to some extent.
However, there appears to be an anxiety that repeatedly
surfaces in relation to both white and black American critics’
reception of Dunham’s work.
In relation to the question of
“authenticity,” Dunham’s work, her image, and even her looks,
seemed whitened, compared to, for example, Pearl Primus. Primus
was a contemporary who pursued similar goals and scholarly
interests as Dunham in the 1940’s, but who did not have
Political Contexts of Afro-American Dance, DANCE RESEARCH JOURNAL
ANNUAL XI 45 (1980), quoting K ATHERINE DUNHAM , THE FUTURE OF THE
NEGRO DANCE , DANCE HERALD 5 (1938).
61 Among the African American dances Dunham used in her choreography
were the juba, cakewalk, ballin’ the jack, and strut. Reynolds, supra note 32 at
341. See also Dunham’s quoted remarks regarding her project of conducting
“an intensive study of the Negro under less absorbing cultural contacts [than
the white system of slavery in the U,S.]; in the West Indies, the French,
Spanish and English influence have been of far less importance than that of
the American in preserving the dance forms which are truly Negro.” Joyce
Aschenbrenner, Katherine Dunham: Reflections on the Social and Political
Contexts of Afro-American Dance, DANCE RESEARCH JOURNAL ANNUAL XI 45
(1980), quoting Katherine Dunham, The Future of the Negro Dance, DANCE
HERALD 5 (1938).
62 See Aschenbrenner, DANCING A LIFE , supra note 31 at 125-126.
63 Valis Hall, supra note 33 at 235.
64 Aschenbrenner, DANCING A LIFE , supra note 31 at 125.
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Dunham’s numerous liminalities, inclusive of Dunham’s looks,
which conformed more to whitened standards of beauty, as
opposed to Primus’ physical appearance. 65 In relation to this
question of “authenticity,” Dunham’s choreographic interpretation
of her ethnographic research has also undergone some critique as
being overly reliant on hybridization, losing specificity, and
perhaps even stereotyping Caribbean culture in general.
Contrastively, in the hands of someone like Martha Graham or
George Balanchine, even if devoid of the intense ethnographic
fieldwork Dunham had accomplished, such “inappropriate cultural
appropriation” would probably have been interpreted as “artistic
innovation,” passing copyright’s “modicum of originality” test
easily. 66 Additionally, given that Dunham’s ethnographic work
drew principally from “folklore” (and from non-American sources)
would probably have made any kind of possible copyright claim
invalid. But that Dunham strategically deployed the established
kinesthetic techniques and body vocabularies of ballet and modern
dance would probably have made any overt legal claim she might
have raised, especially given the circumstances of Cabin in the
Sky, more likely to survive. 67
But given the raced, sexed, and gendered nature of the
politics of the dance world, Dunham wisely refrained; that
savviness is what eventually cemented her commercial success
and artistic independence.
Like Baker, Dunham, instead of
banking on copyright protection, relied on her ability to “curate”
her image through the numerous interviews she gave the media.
But unlike Baker, Dunham did have some access – even if not full
access – to whiteness as status property, and as such, was able to
achieve some acclaim as a choreographer in her own right—but
only after loyal apprenticeship to the ballet master and legally and
culturally enshrined genius, George Balanchine. Thus, similar to
Hernandez-Truyol’s paper on the struggle of the Brazilian
indigenous tribe at the Bel Monte dam to realize their human
Reynolds and McCormick, supra note 32 at 344.
Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346
(1991) (“Originality is a constitutional requirement."); Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1879); The Trademark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (1879). See generally Howard B. Abrams, The Law of Copyright §
1.02[C][4] (Clark Boardman, 1991).
Graham, unlike Dunham, who did
extensive ethnographic fieldwork, created choreographic works that drew from
what she perceived as elements of Native American, Egyptian, Cambodian,
Indian and Japanese dances. See generally Deborah Jowitt, Monumental
Martha, WHAT IS DANCE ? 456-58 (Roger Copeland and Marshall Cohen,eds.,
1983). Balanchine, in his “collaboration” with Dunham in Cabin in the Sky,
received credit for her choreography while she was not named as a
choreographer in the program. Aschenbrenner, DANCING A LIFE , supra note
31 at 125.
67 See Valis Hall, Collaborating with Balanchine, supra note 33 at 238
(showing Dunham stressing her credentials as a ballerina trained by Ludmilla
Speranzeva, who was just as “Russian” and classically trained as Balanchine).
65
66
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rights, Baker’s and Dunham’s strategies of survival both entailed
various degrees of adaptation to, and recasting of, recognized
western legal and choreographic inscriptions. To render their
“traditional knowledge” or “traditional cultural expressions”
legible within systems that still maintain their Eurocentric roots,
indigenous peoples and marginalized groups use a variety of
strategies – not only partially resisting or protesting against the
current hierarchy, but also balancing that imperative with the
need to communicate with, and establish, communities of
sympathy and solidarity, or at the very least, the pragmatic
compunction of not alienating those who are not adamantly proestablishment.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has been a series reflections spurred by several
of the papers delivered and the experiences at LatCrit 2013,
focusing specifically on the themes of strategies of resistance in
relation to narrativity, property and intellectual property, and
collective identity.
Given law’s embeddedness in culture, and
functioning as culture, possible avenues of resistance are multiple.
One such avenue involves simply giving voice to those normally
silenced, with their ambivalent alliances and their porous
identities as members of several communities. Another avenue
involves deconstructing front-stage myths of civic order and
equality to reveal back-stage realities of prejudice and hegemony.
A third alternative lies in adapting prevailing legal and cultural
categories to give voice to, as well as recast, new legal expectations
for justice and equality.
Throughout the article, law has been analyzed as partaking
of an evolving cultural life: that as legal meaning is circulated,
such meaning is communicated in a non-linear manner, and that
the direction can be shifted, depending on who frames the
narrative for specific audiences, and who receive and interpret
these circulations of meaning, in different contexts. Re-evaluating
the construction of categories of law in relation to differing
collective identities and individual subjectivities has generated
new and diverse ways of reflecting upon the law, legal processes
and legal power that reshape the multitude of legal engagements
and interactions within various social contexts.
Extending these insights to include intangible intellectual
property and monstrous metaphors in circulation, the social force
of signification and the material weight that meanings may forge
form natural pivot points for a study of law as/in culture that is
alert to issues of power and meaning, structure and agency,
symbolic forms and interpretive practice. Attempting to leverage a
system entails the insight that law generates and operates in
lacunae in which hegemonic struggles occur, and signs and
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symbols are always contested, and always at risk. Legal strategies
and legal institutions may lend weight to some interpretations
while tending to deny such privileged status to others, often
forming hegemonic binaries, which can be potentially leveraged.
Similarly, the relationships binding authorship, agency, and
alterity bear closer examination, with greater sensitivity to the
politics of textuality, metaphorics, and materiality in various
social circles. Law’s constitutive or generative power, in addition
to its prohibitive or punitive possibilities, must therefore always
be kept in mind, if one is to attempt to continually re-engage what
effective strategies of resistance are possible to enact, within
multiple contexts.

